I. INTRODUCTION
In Lilly v. Virginia 1 the United States Supreme Court examined whether the admission of an accomplice's custodial confession violated a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 2 The statement at issue was admitted into evidence under the "against penal interest" exception to the hearsay rule because the confession contained statements that inculpated both the declarant and the defendant. 3 In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court held that accomplice confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant do not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.! The Court also authorized appellate courts to independently review whether the government's "proffered guarantees of trustworthiness" 5 are sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause's residual admissibility test. 6 This Note examines the history of the Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and the development of the relationship between the "against penal interest" hearsay exception and the Clause. This Note also analyzes the implications of the Lilly decision on future prosecutions of co-defendants. This Note concludes that in Lilly the Supreme Court correctly heightened the standard for admissibility of accomplice statements. The decision in Lilly is especially important because the Supreme REv. 1, 4 (1987) ; Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative Histo"y, 27 RUTGERs L.J. 77, 77 (1995) . "Early American documents almost never mention the right, and the traditional sources for divining the Framers' intent yield almost no information about the clause." Id. The most prevalent abuse was the admission of ex parte affidavits accusing the defendant without an opportunity to question the affiant, illustrated best by Sir Walter Raleigh's 1603 treason trial where the principal witness, Lord Cobham, was never made to testify. See Berger, supra at 571. When Cobham's out-of-court statements-made during various government interrogations-were admitted into evidence to be used against Raleigh, he objected, asserting, "'Proof of the Common Law is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my face, and I have done."' Id. While commentators have debated at length whether Sir Walter Raleigh's experience actually influenced the Framers' decision to include the Confrontation Clause, it illustrates the abusive practices endemic to common law criminal prosecution. See id.
10 SeeBerger, supra note 9, at 585-86. " SeeLilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1894; see also FED. R. EVID. 804.
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v. United States. 2 In Mattox, two central witnesses who had testified against the defendant at his first trial died before the second trial commenced and were thus unavailable for crossexamination at the second trial. 3 The Court held that the transcribed testimony and cross-examinations of the unavailable witnesses from the first trial were admissible in the second trial. 4 The Court stated for the first time that the: primary object of the [Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity,, not only testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.'
5
The Court recognized, however, that particular situations -require a court to admit statements from unavailable witnesses despite the constitutional right to confrontation. 6 The Court asserted that the Framers intended courts to make certain exceptions where public policy warranted them. 7 A dying declaration by a witness to a crime, the Court argued, was such an exception. 8 The Court found that a statement made before death was inherently reliable because one has no reason to lie when facing death.' 9 Although the Mattox Court never mentioned "hearsay" in its opinion, its decision created the first exception to the Confrontation Clause protections in criminal prosecution.° Since Mattox, the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the evidentiary hearsay exceptions has plagued prosecutors, defen-dants, and trial courts. 2 ' Despite the acknowledged exceptions, 22 the Court maintains that the Confrontation Clause, essentially the right to cross-examine one's accuser, is the foundation of the truthseeking process. 2 ' According to the Court, the trier of fact cannot properly judge the accuser's nature or the circumstances surrounding the statement in the absence of a crossexamination. 24 In fact, the Court has asserted that the Confrontation Clause is the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. '' 5 Although the Court continually emphasizes the importance of the right to cross-examine one's accuser, its recent Confrontation Clause opinions have facilitated admission of accusatory statements without cross-examination. 26 Much of the Court's leniency has come in decisions where it broadened its interpretation of permissible unavailability. 27 Seventy years after ruling that statements made prior to death were admissible in Mattox, the Court opined in Douglas v. Alabama 28 that invoking one's Fifth Amendment privileges also satisfied the unavailability requirement of the hearsay rule.29
" Se4 e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992) ; Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 68 (1980) ; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) ; Mattox, 156 U.S. 237.
Congress codified the following exceptions to the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: prior judicial testimony, statement under belief of impending death, statement against interest, statement of personal or family history, and forfeiture by wrongdoing. FED. R. EviD. 804 (b) . "Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887 , 1894 (1999 .
In Douglas, Loyd, an accomplice to the petitioner, invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination" at the petitioner's trial." In response, the judge granted the prosecution's motion to name Loyd a hostile witness, thus permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine him.
The prosecution proceeded to read Loyd his custodial confession sentence by sentence and required Loyd to affirm or deny the veracity of the statements.- 3 The trial court found Douglas guilty and the Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 5 The Court held that by invoking his Fifth Amendment privileges, Loyd was "unavailable" for trial. Further, admitting Loyd's statement without affording the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine his accuser violated the petitioner's right to confrontation. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, asserted that the truth of an accuser's statement is properly tested only by cross-examination. Brennan supported his assertion by citing the Court's opinion in Mattox, where it emphasized the importance of giving a jury the opportunity to consider whether an accuser "is worthy of belief." Here, Brennan indicated, the jury was denied the opportunity to hear Loyd's testimony. As a result, the jury might have improperly construed the prosecutor's reading of the testimony as the truth. Without affording the defendant the right to cross-examine Loyd, the jury was unable to know if Loyd actually made the statements and whether they were true. 39 The Court opined that admission of Loyd's "0 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"' See Douglas, 380 U.S. at 416. Loyd was tried first and found guilty, but he planned to appeal his conviction. Accordingly, his attorney, also counsel to Douglas, advised him to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination. The Court's decision established the Bruton rule that restricted limiting instructions in joint trials. 8 The Court suggested that giving limiting instructions is equivalent to giving no instructions to a jury. 49 The Court recognized that its ruling might hinder criminal prosecution in joint trials, but reasoned that, in many cases, there are less harmful ways to prove the confessor's guilt than by admitting a statement that incriminates a co-defendant. 50 The Court said that where the confessor's codefendant is denied the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, the jury cannot know if the confession was truthful or an attempt to shift the blame to the co-defendant. 5 1 The Court held, therefore, that the admission of a co-defendant's statement that inculpates the defendant, even if the jury is instructed to ignore the incriminating portions, violates the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. 2 These earlier cases were important in shaping the way the Court dealt with the admission of hearsay evidence, but they did not instruct the courts below how to determine what is admissible under the Confrontation Clause. 53 The Court finally established a test in Ohio v. Roberts 54 for determining admissibility of out-of-court statements in the event the witness is "unavailable" for trial. 5 In Roberts, the respondent was charged with check forgery and possession of stolen credit cards belonging to Bernard and Amy Isaacs. 56 64-65 (1980) . In this line of cases, "the Court has not sought to 'map out a theory of the Confrontation Clause that would determine the validity of all... hearsay exceptions." ' Id. (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970) 
2000]
Roberts testified that Anita gave him use of her father's checks and credit cards. 59 Anita, however, did not appear at trial and her parents maintained that they did not know where she resided6 The trial court found her "unavailable" for trial and admitted her preliminary hearing testimony over the respondent's objection that it violated his Confrontation Clause rights. 1 After conducting a voir dire hearing as to the admissibility of Anita's preliminary hearing testimony, the court ruled that Anita was unavailable because no one, including her parents, knew how to reach her. 62 The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Anita was not unavailable and "the mere opportunity to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing did not afford constitutional confrontation for purposes of trial." 63 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule exceptions and reversed. 4 The Court held that Anita was, in fact, constitutionally unavailable for respondent's trial because the prosecution made a good faith effort to locate her before the trial.65 The Court also held that the preliminary hearing afforded the respondent an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness and that the transcript "bore sufficient indicia of reliability" to provide the trier of fact with "a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement."6
The Roberts Court took this opportunity to erect a twopronged inquiry for determining when statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule also satisfy the Confrontation Clause. First, the prosecution must demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable to testify.' Once unavailability is proven and the necessity of the statement is determined, the 2IJLLYv. VIRGINIA statement must be deemed to be sufficiently reliable to make the right to confrontation unnecessary.6 A statement is sufficiently dependable if: (1) it falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception"; or (2) it contains "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, such that adversarial testing would be expected to add little, if anything, to the statements' reliability." The Court has continued to shape the Roberts test into a useful tool for determining reliability in cases where the witness is unavailable to testify. 71 Six years after Roberts in Lee v. Illinois, 72 the Court utilized the Roberts test to determine whether a confession by a co-defendant was admissible in ajoint trial. 73 In this case, the petitioner, Lee, and her boyfriend, Thomas, were tried jointly in a bench trial for a double murder; neither Lee nor Thomas testified. 74 In proving Lee guilty of the murders, the prosecutor depended heavily on portions of Thomas's police confession obtained at the time of the arrest. 75 The appeals court affirmed the use of the confession because the co-defendants' stories "interlocked," suggesting reliability. 76 The United States Supreme Court reversed, however, and held that admission of Thomas's confession violated Lee's right to confrontation. 7 The Court followed the analysis set forth in Roberts and concluded that accomplice statements in general are presumptively suspect and in this case the circumstances surrounding the statement did not provide sufficient indicia of reliability to override the presumption. 78 The Court also asserted that "a confession is not necessarily rendered reliable simply because some of the facts it contains 69 See id.
" Id. at 66. The Court did not define "firmly rooted." See Goldman, supra note 9, at 3. Since Roberts, courts have referred to the second prong as the "residual admissibility test" to suggest that a statement not falling into a firmly rooted exception must satisfy this test to be admitted into evidence under the Confrontation Clause. Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1899 (1999 A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests ofjustice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
IDAHO IL EVID. 803(24).
87 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 812.
[Vol. 90
LLLYv. VIRGINIA hearsay exception and the interview lacked substantial guarantees of trustworthiness. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed and reversed her conviction.9 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed. 9°T he Court held that the medical examiner's testimony reiterating statements made by Wright's younger daughter violated Wright's Confrontation Clause protections. 9 ' Using the Roberts test, the Court reasoned that Idaho's residual hearsay exception was not a firmly rooted exception and that the young girl's statements lacked the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness necessary to satisfy the requirements of the Clause. 92 The Court stated that corroborating evidence does not make a statement more reliable. 93 Instead the statement at issue must bear "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" on its own merits.
Admitting hearsay statements simply because other evidence corroborates them, the Court said, would permit "bootstrapping" of presumptively unreliable evidence onto the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial. 95 The Court, however, did not establish a per se rule excluding statements made by declarants unable to communicate to the jury at the time of trial. 96 The Court argued that a "per se rule of exclusion would not only frustrate the truthseeking purpose of the Confrontation Clause, but would also hinder States in their own 'enlightened development in the law of evidence.' 9 7 The Court maintained that lower courts must engage in a factual determination of the trustworthiness of each statement on its own merits. 9 8 In Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court and quickly rejected petitioner's argument that the Court should limit its interpretation of "witness against" to cases analogous to the abuses common in the sixteenth-and seventeenth-centuries. 05 The Court argued that such a narrow reading of the Confrontation Clause "would virtually eliminate [the Clause's] role in restricting the admission of hearsay testimony." 1 ' 6 The Court sought instead to "steer a middle course" that permits certain excep-107 tions to the hearsay rule when appropriate.
The Court recognized that certain statements of unavailable witnesses should be admitted if they fit within "firmly rooted exceptions" to the hearsay rule and are thus so trustworthy that cross-examination would add little or no value for the trier of fact.' 08 The Court reasoned that exceptions become firmly rooted as, over time, courts recognize that the context in which the statements are made suggest "substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness."' 9 The Court stated, however, that despite the permissive use of hearsay statements in cases where the statement was a spontaneous declaration, in cases where a co-defendant or accomplice Although Harris fully incriminated himself as an accomplice during his police confession, he refused to testify at Williamson's trial 123 The trial court allowed the DEA agent to recount the confession to the jury under the "against penal interest exception. , 124 The Supreme Court reversed the decision and held that Rule 804(b) (3), the "against penal interest" exception, did not permit the admission of non-self-inculpating statements even if they were contained in a statement that is selfinculpating on the whole.' t s The Court argued that selfinculpation did not make the non-self-inculpatory statement more credible, particularly where the declarant accuses another of a more serious crime. In fact, a reasonable person might try to mask the exculpatory language with a general statement 127 implicating him or herself for the less serious crime.
The Court noted that its decision to bar admission of any non-self-inculpating statements would limit the prosecutors' ability to use custodial confessions during trial, but it suggested that truly self-inculpating statements would continue to be admissible.
The Court recommended reviewing the context in which the statement was made in determining whether it can be classified as an exception.'2 The Court carefully removed the ability of accomplices and co-defendants to bury selfexculpating statements in a self-inculpating confession, thus restoring some of the constitutional guarantees of the Sixth Amendment!"°D espite this line of cases, litigants and courts continue to struggle with the relationship between the Confrontation Clause The crime spree began when the three men, who had been drinking and smoking marijuana at Petitioner's home, drove in Petitioner's car to the home of Danny Sanders, a friend of Petitioner.
13 5 When they arrived, Sanders was not there.ls They broke into his home and stole several bottles of liquor, a safe, and three guns.
13 ' They then went to the home of another friend, Warren Nolan, where they '3' Although the Roberts tests purports to instruct lower courts in their determinations of admissibility, determinations by state and federal courts are often challenged and reversed. See Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1893 (1999) tried unsuccessfully to "trade the guns for some dope."' ' 8 After Barker stated that "he would shoot the police if they attempted to arrest him,"' ' 9 Nolan's girlfriend asked them to leave. 1 40 The three men then drove to the trailer where Mark Lilly and Barker rented a room and proceeded to "'drink all night."' 4 The following morning, the three men left the trailer and drove around the countryside.
They stopped at the home of Mike Lang, another friend of Mark Lilly and Barker, and asked him to join them. Lang's mother, however, refused to let Lang go with Mark Lilly and Barker after Barker stated in front of her '43 that he could kill his best friend and not feel remorse.
After they left Lang's house, Petitioner, Mark Lilly, and Barker drove around the area, drank the stolen liquor, robbed a convenience store, and shot geese with the stolen guns. 44 Later that day, they drove back to the trailer where they again tried unsuccessfully to sell or trade the stolen pistol for marijuana.' 45 They then drove to a bar where Mark Lilly unsuccessfully tried to sell the rifle to a co-worker.
46
Early that evening, as Petitioner, Mark Lilly, and Barker cruised around the countryside, Petitioner's car broke down.
47
He coasted down a hill and stopped across the street from a convenience store where the three men took the license plates off the car and removed the guns. 4 8 They intended to hide the guns and the license plates in the woods until they could find another car to use. Meanwhile, DeFilippis and his college roommate arrived at the convenience store at approximately the same time. 5 9 When DeFilippis's roommate went into the store, " Joint Appendix at 105-107, Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887 Ct. (1999 54 He told DeFilippis to sit in the back seat with Mark Lilly. 55 Petitioner quickly drove out of the parking lot, but did not disclose where the four men were going. As they drove, DeFilippis repeatedly asked Petitioner to return to the convenience store so he could pick up his roommate. 55 DeFilippis also offered to drive Petitioner wherever he wanted to go.' 5 Petitioner ignored DeFilippis's requests and instead drove to a deserted piece of property.' 5 8 When Petitioner stopped the car, Mark Lilly and Barker told DeFilippis to close his eyes so he could not look at their faces. 59 The four men exited the car and Mark Lilly told DeFilippis to start walking).'
Petitioner shouted after him to take off all of his clothes.'" After DeFilippis started walking and Mark Lilly and Barker returned to the car, Petitioner demanded that Mark Lilly give him the stolen .38 caliber pistol.
6 1 Mark Lilly gave him the pistol and instead of getting into the car, Petitioner ran after DeFilippis into the woods. 1 63 DeFilippis was shot four times; three shots were to his head and one went through his forearm.'r DeFilippis died quickly after being shot in the brain.' When Petitioner returned to the car, he told Mark Lilly and Barker that DeFilippis had seen his face, so he had to shoot The men subsequently drove to the river to discard the items they believed had their fingerprints on them, including DeFilippis's clothes and backpack and the plastic cover on the speedometer.ee Soon thereafter, the three men robbed two more convenience stores. 169 The owner of the second store followed Petitioner, Mark Lilly, and Barker and reported to the police the license plate number of the car stolen from DeFilippis.1 7 ' Driving awa from the second store, however, the stolen car broke down.
The police arrived on the scene shortly after the car stopped. 7 2 When the police arrived, Mark Lilly and Barker fled into the woods and Petitioner stayed in the 173 car.
The police arrested Petitioner for the two convenience store robberies' 74 and held him at the scene for about two hours. 75 Approximately ten to thirty minutes later, the police found Barker a few yards from the road sitting with the rifle pointed at his head. 76 The police convinced him to surrender and took him immediately to the station for questioning. . While Petitioner was waiting in the car, he allegedly asked one of the officers to "put the barrel of the officer's shotgun in his mouth and pull the trigger." Respondent's Brief at 6, Lilly Mark Lilly repeatedly told the officers that he was drunk during the entire spree. He confessed to participating in the thefts of the alcohol, but told the police that he was simply present during the more serious robberies and the homicide.1'8 Upon prompting by police to "break family ties" to avoid a life sentence, Mark Lilly admitted that Petitioner instigated the carjacking and that he [Mark Lilly] did not have anything to do with the shooting. ' 9 Mark Lilly also told the police that Petitioner "was the one who shot DeFilippis."' 9
Petitioner was questioned last. 9 The jury found Petitioner guilty of robbery, abduction, carjacking, possession of a firearm by a felon, and four counts of illegal use of a firearm, and sentenced him to two consecutive life terms plus twenty-seven years for these crimes.
20 7 The jury also found Petitioner guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to death. 0 On petition to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Petitioner argued that pursuant to Virginia state law, the "against penal interest" hearsay exception never should apply to evidence offered by the Commonwealth against the defendant. The Virginia Supreme Court denied the petition for rehearing on June 5, 1998, in an unpublished, summary order. 1 9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 9, 1998, to resolve whether the accused's Confrontation Clause rights were "violated by admitting into evidence at his trial a nontestifying accomplice's entire confession that contained some statements against the accomplice's penal interest and others that inculpated the accused., are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
Justice Stevens also held that appellate courts should independently review the government's proffered guarantees of trustworthiness under the second half of the Roberts inquiry. 2t Justice Stevens asserted in Part II of the opinion that the Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case despite the Commonwealth of Virginia's claim to the contrary. 226 unless adversarial testing would add little to the reliability of the statements. 3 4 Justice Stevens acknowledged the argument made most recently in White v. Illinois 2 5 for a narrow reading of the Confrontation Clause, particularly with respect to the phrase "witnesses against. ,2 1 6 Justice Stevens maintained, however, that the right to confrontation should not be limited only to preventing practices analogous to. prosecution by ex parte affidavits. 3 The Court concluded that such a narrow reading of "witnesses" "would have virtually eliminated the Clause's role in restricting the admission of hearsay testimony," something the Court was unprepared to do.s Justice Stevens noted, however, that Mark Lilly's statements were analogous to the use of ex parte affidavits because they were obtained by police with the intention of using them as evidence at a future trial23 9 Accordingly, Justice Stevens concluded that admission of Mark Lilly's statements raised a Confrontation Clause issue regardless of the Court's interpretation of the Clause's language.
Justice Stevens applied the first prong of the Roberts test to Mark Lilly's confession in Part IV and held that his statements did not fall within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. 241 In Lee v. llinos, 245 however, the Court determined that the simple characterization of "against penal interest" defines a class too large for Confrontation Clause analysis. 246 Justice Stevens, therefore, discussed three common scenarios where the "against penal interest" exception is invoked in criminal cases. 247 He stated that the exception is invoked when hearsay statements are offered into evidence:
(1) as voluntary admissions against the declarant; (2) as exculpatory evidence offered by a defendant who claims that the declarant committed, or was involved in, the offense; and (3) as evidence offered by theprosecution to establish guilt of an alleged accomplice of the declarant.
According to Justice Stevens, Mark Lilly's statements fall under the third general category, where the government seeks to introduce a statement by an accomplice that incriminates the defendant. 249 This category presents particular problems to the Court.250 First, admission of these statements under the "against penal interest" exception is of "fairly recent vintage."25 Second, it typically includes statements that when "offered in the absence of the declarant function similarly to those used in the Under the Roberts test, if a statement does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, it must bear particularized guarantees of trustworthiness such that adversarial testing would add little to its reliability, thus satisfying the residual admissibility test. 2 6 In Part V, Justice Stevens held that it is "highly unlikely" that the government will be able to rebut the presumptive unreliability attached to accomplices' custodial confessions necessary to satisfy the Roberts residual admissibility test.
2 1
Justice Stevens concluded that the circumstances surrounding Mark Lilly's statements did not provide a guarantee of trustworthiness that would have made a cross-examination superfluous. 26 Justice Stevens rejected the Commonwealth's position that Mark Lilly's statements were trustworthy simply because (1) Gary Barker's testimony and the physical evidence corroborated Mark Lilly's statements; (2) the police read Mark Lilly his Miranda rights before he made his statements and thus Mark appreciated the seriousness of his accusation; and (3) Mark implicated himself in other serious crimes. 6 7 A determination regarding whether a hearsay statement has particularized guarantees of trustworthiness is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law. 2 8 Appellate courts, therefore, have a responsibility to review de novo lower courts' determinations of the trustworthiness of a custodial statement. 26 9 The tendency for accomplices to shift or spread blame makes it difficult for prosecutors to overcome the presumptive unreliability the Court has attached to accomplice confessions. 270 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens analyzed the circumstances surrounding Mark Lilly's statements to determine their trust- (1986) worthiness in light of the presumption of unreliability. First, he rejected the claim that Mark Lilly's statement was sufficiently reliable simply because the other evidence, including Barker's testimony, corroborated the story. 27 ' Justice Stevens argued that in Wright, the Court held that "hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial 27 2 Justice Stevens also dismissed the Commonwealth's argument that Mark Lilly's statements were more reliable because the police informed him of his Miranda rights. 73 The Court concluded that knowledge of one's rights typically has very little bearing on the truth of one's statements when the declarant is being questioned about her involvement in a serious crime. 4 Third, the Court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that Mark Lilly must have been telling the truth simply because he implicated himself in the crime spree.2 Justice Stevens asserted that a confession that includes self-inculpating statements does not make the non-self-inculpating portions more credible. 6 In this case, specifically, the police asked leading questions and suggested to Mark Lilly that he had a motive to exculpate himself from the serious crime of capital murder. 277 Furthermore, Mark Lilly admitted to being under the influence of drugs and alcohol during his questioning. 78 All of these factors supported the Court's conclusion that Mark Lilly's statements were not sufficiently reliable to eliminate the need for confrontation and cross-examination. 279 Finally, in Part VI the Court held that admitting Mark Lilly's custodial confession accusing the defendant of capital murder violated Petitioner's Confrontation Clause rights.
'
The Court 271 See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1900-01. ' Id. at 1901 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990 Justice Breyer wrote separately, arguing that the Court should reexamine its view of the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule. 2 Currently, a statement against a defendant must fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or bear particularized guarantees of trustworthiness to be admitted under the Confrontation Clause .
2 " This close connection between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule is of relatively recent vintage, whereas the Confrontation Clause has "ancient origins that predate the hearsay rule. 2 Justice Breyer reiterated that the right to confrontation was established originally to prevent abuses by the government against a criminal defendant on trial . 2 e This right, he argued, has been undermined by the numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule the Court has permitted under Confrontation Clause analysis. 86 Justice Breyer asserted that the "current hearsay-based Confrontation Clause test" is "both too narrow and too broad.,
The test is too narrow because it permits admission of out-ofcourt statements that fall within a "firmly rooted hearsay excep- don" regardless of their reliabilitysss Justice Breyer used the coconspiracy exception as an example and suggested that if the conspiracy happened to continue through the time of police questioning, the confession could be admitted without crossexamination. 289 Criminal defendants, Breyer contended, should not be denied the right to "come face to face" with their accusers simply because of fortuitous circumstances&°A t the same time, Justice Breyer contended that the current test is too broad because it requires the Court to make a "constitutional issue out of the admission of any relevant hearsay statement, even if that hearsay statement is only tangentially related to the elements in dispute. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)).
contradict the historical basis of the Confrontation Clause and make appellate review of admission of accomplice statements impossible." 0 7 Justice Thomas also agreed with the Chief Justice's assertion that the Court should not have analyzed the reliability of the confession under the second prong of the Roberts°8 test since the courts below did not address that issue. 9 E. CHIEFJUSTICE REHNQUIST'S CONCURRENCE
The Chief Justice '0 concurred in the judgment reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia but disagreed with both of the plurality's major holdings.
3 r He disagreed with the Court's declarations (1) that all accomplice confessions inculpating a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, and (2) that appellate courts should independently review the government's proffered guarantees of trustworthiness under the second prong of the Roberts test. 3' 1 The Chief Justice argued first that Mark Lilly's statements were not against his penal interest. 1 3 The self-inculpatory portion of Mark Lilly's confession suggesting he aided and abetted the petitioner was very separate from the portion where he accused his brother of murdering DeFilippis.Y Mark Lilly's entire statement, therefore, could not be characterized as against his penal interest.
31 5 Consequently, the Chief Justice contended that this case did not raise the question whether a genuinely self-inculpatory statement that also inculpates a co-defendant '0Id.
(Thomas,J., concurring). m Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) . Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1903 (ThomasJ, concurring) . "" The ChiefJustice was joined byJustices O'Connor and Kennedy. 31Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1903 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring). [Vol. 90
LULLYv. VIRGINIA violates the Confrontation Clause. The Chief Justice asserted that given the facts of this case, "our precedent does not compel the broad holding suggested by the plurality...., 17 The Chief Justice reasoned that the cases cited by the plurality in support of its "broad holding" involved custodial confessions by accomplices taken by police for prosecution."" He argued that incriminating statements made during custodial confessions have always been viewed with special suspicion by the Court given the declarant's motivation to shift blame to a co-defendant. 319 The Chief Justice agreed with the Court that admission of these statements violates the right to confrontation, but there are some situations, he contended, where accomplice statements may fall under a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
The Chief Justice suggested that certain statements, such as confessions made to family members and friends or fellow prisoners, bear sufficient indicia of reliability that would make confrontation superfluous. Because the Court has always distinguished these cases from custodial confessions, the Chief Justice argued that the Court should continue to permit admission of such statements. 22 The Chief Justice noted, however, that Mark Lilly's statements did not fall into this category because his confession was exculpatory in nature and might have been motivated by blame-shiftings2 The Chief Justice asserted that he would hold only that Mark Lilly's statement cannot satisfy a firmly rooted hearsay exception and it should not be admissible without the right to confrontation. 3 II, See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The ChiefJustice argued that the plurality mischaracterized Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) . He asserted that Dutton was not an "exception" to the line of cases, but distinguishable because the confession was made to a fellow inmate, not to the police in a custodial inquiry. Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1905 (Rehnquist, Cj., concurring) .
See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). See id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring). 32 Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
Chief Justice, therefore, this case did not warrant such a broad ruling by the Court. 3 2 Secondly, the Chief Justice argued that the Court should have remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Virginia to decide the harmless-error question and whether Mark Lilly's confession bears "'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' under Roberts.0 26 The Virginia court addressed whether the confession was admissible under state hearsay rules, but not whether it violated the Confrontation Clause.
The Chief Justice concluded that the court below did not address the issue and thus the plurality should not have ruled on whether Mark's statements were admissible under the second prong of Roberts. 8 Furthermore, the Chief Justice argued that in the absence of a lower court ruling as to the reliability of the statements under the Confrontation Clause, the Court cannot rationalize its ruling that appellate courts must independently review a lower court's determination of trustworthiness. 3 The Chief Justice asserted that the Court should have deferred to trial court judges' determinations of reliability.°3 0 Although a determination of reliability is a mixed question of fact and law, the Chief Justice argued that it "weighs heavily on the 'fact' side." ' ' He maintained that an independent review of trustworthiness undermines the accuracy of a trial court judge's factual determination. 332 Appellate courts and the Supreme Court in particular, therefore, should defer to the factual findings of the trial courts that are better positioned to evaluate the reliability of hearsay statements. 3 V. ANALYSIS In Lilly v. Virginia, the Court properly held that an accomplice's confession inculpating a criminal defendant does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.s The Court did not, however, establish a per se rule barring admission of accomplices' confessions as proposed by the ACLU. 8 5 Because the Court decided to reaffirm the Roberts test in lieu of a bright line test for admissibility, Justice Stevens authorized appellate courts to independently review lower courts' determinations of trustworthiness under the residual admissibility test. 3 1 6 Lilly will make it more difficult for the government to prosecute co-defendants, but the Court properly bolstered criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment rights against the government's interest in expedient criminal prosecution. 3 7 Nevertheless, Lilly did not significandy impact the Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence except to affirmatively declare that accomplices' statements inculpating a criminal defendant must be carefully scrutinized for sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.
A. DEFINING "FIRMLY ROOTED"
The ChiefJustice criticized the plurality for broadly holding that accomplices' confessions inculpating a criminal defendant do not fall within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.sss The ChiefJustice suggested that the holding was unnecessary in light of the facts of this case. 3 9 This Note argues, however, thatJustice Stevens' discourse served to dispel some of the confusion as to what makes certain hearsay exceptions "firmly rooted." ' Justice Stevens used the Roberts residual admissibility test to justify his holding that these "against penal interest" exceptions [hereinafter States' Brief] (' The amici states are charged with the responsibility of protecting the citizens of their respective states by the capture, conviction and removal of criminals from the general civilian population.").
" 3 Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1903 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring) . " 'Id. at 1904 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring) . The ChiefJustice explained that Mark Lilly's confession was exculpatory in nature and the statements incriminating his brother were "not in the least against [his] penal interest." Id.
'40 See Goldman, supra note 9, at 3. Goldman argued that the "firmly rooted" distinction is "neither workable nor useful" and proposed that a better method for determining admissibility is a case-by-case analysis of trustworthiness. Id. are not firmly rooted hearsay exceptions!" In so doing, Justice Stevens suggested that a statement falls within a firmly rooted exception if it has historically satisfied the residual admissibility test. 2 Because Confrontation Clause requirements were satisfied when the statement was made under circumstances that provided sufficient "indicia of reliability" and "the demands of the Confrontation Clause 'can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,' 3 43 it is logical to conclude that a statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception only if it has historically been made under circumstances that provided sufficient indicia of reliability. Statements that fall within a firmly rooted exception, therefore, have provided sufficient indicia of reliability over time to make a fact-specific determination unnecessary. 3 " Justice Stevens properly concluded that this category of "against penal interest" exceptions does not fall within a firmly rooted exception. Justice Stevens laboriously demonstrated that this category of statements lacks both historic precedent and presumptive reliability to warrant admission without adversarial testing.' While the ChiefJustice argued that the plurality's discussion of the various "against penal interest" categories was unnecessary, this Note contends that Justice Stevens's explanation provided lower courts with the Court's reasoning behind the first prong of the Roberts test and may serve to limit the use 34 Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1895-99. 312Id . at 1895. ,43 Goldman, supra note 9, at 6 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) ). 14" See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1898. The Court has been criticized for not defining clearly the indicia of reliability necessary to satisfy the Roberts test. Although it did not explicitly propose what appropriate "indicia" would be, it discussed at length some of the factors necessary for such an inquiry, such as history of the exception, length of use, and judicial precedent. See Goldman, supra note 9, at 2-3. The ACLU argued, however, that "trustworthiness" must be better defined. See Motion For Leave to File and Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Virginia, In Support of Petitioner at 18, Lilly provided the Court with another opportunity to reexamine its interpretation of the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule. 47 The Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule are similar in that both exclude from evidence certain out-of-court statements, but not every statement "admissible under all judicially or statutorily created hearsay exceptions will necessarily comply with the requirements of confrontation." 3 8 Nevertheless, the Court has, in effect, merged the two in its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.3 9 As a result, the Court has been criticized both for denigrating the right to confrontation and constitutionalizing evidentiary rules.s
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer argued that the plurality should have reexamined the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule. 5 1 This Note argues, however, that Justice Stevens adopted much of the ACLU's argument for greater protection of Sixth Amendment rights without jeopardizing the public interest in prosecuting criminals. 52 The ACLU argued that the Court should adopt a per se rule for the exclusion of certain accomplice statements 353 while sixteen state Attorneys General argued that the hearsay rule should be broadened to provide triers of fact with the maximum amount of evidence possible. 54 The ACLU made a historical, textual, and prudential argument for the adoption of a per se rule that states certain kinds of confessions never satisfy the Confrontation Clause. 55 The ACLU first explained the historical premise of the Confrontation Clause.
The ACLU argued that the Framers did not intend the right to confrontation to be qualified by the Court's evaluation of the witness' statement. M 7 The ACLU also asserted that the Confrontation Clause should be analyzed within the context of the Sixth Amendment as a whole. 5s Confrontation is not purely an evidentiary fact-finding tool, the ACLU contended, but an integral piece of the general protections afforded criminal defendants. 5 9 Rights enunciated in the Sixth Amendment, such as the rights to an impartial jury, to obtain witnesses in one's favor, and to have defense counsel, suggest that fact-finding was not the Framers' primary concern.-The ACLU asserted that the Supreme Court had lost sight of the historical and textual basis for the Confrontation Clause and had focused too heavily on its fact-finding role.
3 61 The ACLU proposed that the Court reestablish the constitutional protections of the Confrontation Clause as intended by the Framers and significantly limit the permissible exceptions in an effort to "re- sentencing laws like Virginia's "triggerman" statute." 7 ' In cases where the government lacks concrete evidence to prosecute one defendant for murder, co-participants have a strong incentive to confess early and blame a cohort for the actual murder. 72 Because the government faces significant societal pressure to convict, especially in heinous crimes like the murder of DeFilippis in Lilly, the prosecution has strong incentive to believe the declarant s5 In such cases, however, the prosecution prefers to protect the declarant from potentially damaging crossexamination. 3 Grayson County 1997) ). Cressell was charged with capital murder and Ceparano entered into a plea agreement with the government to testify that Cressell murderedJohnson. See id. at 13. After an intense two-hour cross-examination of the accuser, the jury returned a verdict downgrading the defendant's conviction to first degree murder, sparing him from a death sentence. See id. at 14. Had the accomplice's confession been admitted without subjecting him to confrontation and crossexamination, the jury might not have drawn the same conclusion. Thus, admission of incriminating statements without the right to cross-examination interferes with the truthfinding process. See id. public policy. 3 6 Since then, the Court has repeatedly refused to create a per se rule excluding hearsay statements, choosing instead to rely on a trustworthiness determination. 377 Accordingly, Justice Stevens utilized the ACLU's argument to the fullest extent possible without jeopardizing the government's ability to prosecute criminals and utilize permissible exceptions to the hearsay rule. There are times when even accomplice statements, which the Court has deemed to be presumptively unreliable, are made in circumstances that guarantee trustworthi-378 ness.
The sixteen states writing as Amici Curiae in support of Virginia argued that these particular circumstances actually warrant greater leniency in the hearsay rule. 3 s The states argued that the "search for truth," arguably the goal of every trial and the premise on which the Confrontation Clause was based, can only be realized by providing the trier of fact with all the relevant information available."' This Note suggests that Justice Stevens recognized the government's need to introduce as much reliable evidence as possible in a criminal prosecution and therefore reaffirmed and explained the Roberts residual admissibility test. Had Justice Stevens adopted the states' position and broadened permissible hearsay exceptions, the Court would have threatened the constitutional right to confrontation.
This Note recognizes that the Court's ruling will make it more difficult to prosecute in cases with multiple defendants because custodial confessions cannot be easily admitted into evidence. Lilly, however, permits prosecutors to introduce accomplice statements so long as they can overcome the presumption of unreliability under careful scrutiny by the court by demonstrating sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.s 1 While this Note agrees with the states that fact-finding and truthseeking are critical to a fair trial, the plurality properly pro- Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1899 n.5.
The Court did not present a list of factors in Lilly or in its precedent cases for lower courts to consider in determining admissibility of hearsay statements. Stanley Goldman contended that the Court's failure to discuss factors that suggest reliability "is a major flaw in the Supreme Court's attempt to set forth a definitive standard for determining which hearsay statement can be admitted without violating the confrontation clause." Goldman, supra note 9, at 14.
" Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56, 68 n.9 (1980 Independent review protects criminal defendants from trial courts' broad discretion to admit hearsay statements pursuant to the second prong of the Roberts test.s9 As Justice Stevens suggested, "'independent review is ... necessary ... to maintain control of, and to clarify the legal principles' governing the factual circumstances necessary to satisfy the protections of the Bill of Rights." 94
D. THE IMPLICATION OF LJLLYON FUTURE ACCOMPLICES AND CO-DEFENDANTS
Lilly did not significantly change the Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. While the plurality explicitly stated that accomplice statements inculpating criminal defendant did not fall within a firmly rooted exception, 95 the Court had already established that, albeit implicitly. 9 Furthermore, Lilly simply reiterated the Court's prior finding that accomplices' confessions taken by the government for the use at trial are presumptively unreliable. 7 The combination of the two provisions, however, raised the burden for prosecutors to introduce such statements. 398 S. 690, 697 (1996) ).
Id. at 1899.
' Id. at 1899 n.5 (where the Court notes that several of its previous decisions "were all premised, explicitly or implicitly, on the principle that accomplice confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant... fall outside a firmly rooted hearsay exception...").
97 Id. at 1900. 39 See id. tion.°8 In fact, the Southern District of New York suggested in United States v. Petrillo that Lilly did little more than place a "gloss" on prior law. 4 0 9 This Note contends that while the plurality carefully balanced the competing interests of defendants' rights and prosecutorial efficiency, its decision not to create a bright line rule for admissibility of accomplice statements inculpating a defendant makes it likely that the Court has not heard its last case regarding the interplay of against penal interest exceptions and the Confrontation Clause.
E. IMPAGr OF THE PLURALITY OPINION ON FUTURE LITIGATION
Finally, it should be noted that while the Court's plurality decision left the door open for the government to push for a more lenient rule for the admission of accomplices' statements, the concurring opinions did not provide much reasoning on which future litigants can rely. 41 ' Justice Breyer argued that the Court should have reexamined the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule to alleviate some of the confusion regarding admissibility of hearsay evidence under the Clause. 1 2 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, asserted that the facts so clearly indicated a Confrontation Clause violation that no further discussion was warranted by the Court.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, however, contended that the plurality moved too far from the "middle ground" on which the Court had rested. 4 Although Justice Stevens did not establish a "blanket ban" on the admission of all accomplice state-4 See e.g., Gallego, 191 F.3d at 167; Lopez-Garcia, 1999 WL 707783, at *3; Petrillo, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 218; Gonzales, 989 P.2d at 427 (all citing to Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999 ).
4
1 Petrillo, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 218. 41' Because the Court gave appellate courts authorization to independently review determinations of trustworthiness, the defendant in Gonzales, 989 P.2d 417 might petition the Court for certiorari. In this case, the Supreme Court of New Mexico distinguished Lilly and held that the accomplice's statement made during casual conversation with an acquaintance bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to overcome the presumption of unreliability. Id. at 422. Contrary to the concerns voiced by ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustice Thomas, the Gonzales holding illustrated that on occasion a court will decide an accomplice statement inculpating a criminal defendant is trustworthy and should be admitted. 4,,Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1187 , 1901 -06 (1999 .
Id. at 1901-03 (BreyerJ., concurring). " Id. at 1903 (ScaliaJ., concurring) . ", Id. at 1904 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 1903 (ThomasJ, concurring) . ments incriminating a defendant as the ChiefJustice and Justice Thomas suggested, the plurality did make it more difficult for prosecutors to introduce such statements into evidence. 415 Justice Thomas and the Chief Justice apparently feared the plurality moved too close to a "per se rule" and argued that the facts of this case did not warrant the broad holding.
With the exception ofJustice Breyer, therefore, the concurring justices based their opinions on the specific facts of this case. As Justice Breyer anticipated, therefore, Lilly left "the question [of the current connection between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule] open for another day." VI. CONCLUSION In Lilly v. Virginia, the Court properly held that accomplices' statements that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 41 ' Furthermore, the Court stated that the circumstances surrounding accomplice custodial confessions incriminating a defendant are presumptively unreliable. 418 Thus, the prosecution must prove that the circumstances in which the statements were made bear sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to make cross-examination unnecessary. 1 9 The Court also authorized appellate courts to independently review the government's "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" when deciding if admission of a declarant's out-of-court statement violates the Confrontation Clause. 2°T he plurality's explanation of the rationale behind the "firmly rooted" hearsay exception served to clarify some of the confusion about admissibility of hearsay exceptions. The Court properly reaffirmed the Roberts test, which permits courts to admit such statements if they can overcome the presumption of unreliability and demonstrate sufficient trustworthiness so as to make confrontation and cross-examination unnecessary, but failed to articulate what factors courts should consider in determining trustworthiness. Because Lilly did not establish a per se rule excluding accomplice statements that inculpate a crimi-4-Id. at 1900.
416 Id. at 1904 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring [Vol. 90 nal defendant, the Court authorized appellate courts to review the determinations of trustworthiness to ensure protection of the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.
While Lilly provided an excellent discussion of the constitutional dangers inherent in admitting an accomplice's custodial confession, it is unlikely that the Court has heard its last case on the admission of hearsay evidence under a Confrontation Clause analysis.
Sarah D. Heisler

